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Individual differences in the explicit power motive predict “utilitarian” choices in 21 
moral dilemmas, especially when this choice is self-beneficial 22 
 23 
We all face moral decisions, whether we are judges, politicians, or just riding the bus. 24 
The most well studied of these involve concerns of harming or caring for other people, which 25 
have often been researched by employing hypothetical moral dilemmas. This study 26 
investigated how the explicit power motive, more precisely the hope to gain power 27 
(h_Power), predicts decisions for these types of problems. We found that h_Power was 28 
positively related to deciding that it was morally acceptable to kill one person to save 29 
multiple others (i.e., making a utilitarian choice). In an exploratory analysis, we found that 30 
the probability of making such choices as a function of h_Power was even higher when 31 
participants’ own lives were at stake as compared to only the lives of others. These findings 32 
complement previous research showing that personality variables as well as situational 33 
factors predict moral decision making. Finding biases in moral decision making is important, 34 
as only when we know these biases we can consciously counteract them.  35 
 36 
Keywords: explicit power motive; hope to gain power; utilitarian choice; egoistic 37 
bias; self-concern; moral decision making; moral dilemmas.  38 
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Individual differences in the explicit power motive predict “utilitarian” choices in 39 
moral dilemmas, especially when this choice is self-beneficial1 40 
 41 
1. Introduction 42 
Professions that come with considerable power, such as judges, politicians, or 43 
managers (hereinafter “power professions”), often involve making moral decisions. This 44 
means making decisions based on “prescriptive judgements […] pertaining to how people 45 
ought to relate to each other” (p.3; Turiel, 1983) in certain moral domains (see Graham, 46 
Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2011). In Western societies, the most prevalent of these 47 
moral domains is concerned with caring for or harming other people (Hofmann, Wisneski, 48 
Brandt, & Skitka, 2014). For example, a judge might have to decide whether or not to keep a 49 
murderer imprisoned, despite eligibility for parole. Similarly, a politician might have to 50 
decide whether she favours sending soldiers into war, which might save civilian lives but 51 
would endanger the soldiers. However, one does not need to be in a power profession to face 52 
moral decisions. For example, one might have to decide whether it is morally appropriate or 53 
not to ask a parent with a baby-pram to leave the bus in order to make the little space 54 
available to a disabled person waiting at the bus stop. The British Court of Appeal has 55 
recently decided to abolish previous laws that regulated this situation, leaving the decision to 56 
"the good sense of general people" (Barret, 2014). If we assume that a person wants to make 57 
the morally appropriate decision in these situations, then this decision undoubtedly depends 58 
on a person’s own judgement of what is morally appropriate.  59 
                                                          
1 Abbreviations used in this article: h_Power (hope to gain power), f_Power (fear to lose power), FoLC (fear to 
lose control), FoLR (fear to lose reputation), BAS (behavioural approach sensitivity), BIS (behavioural inhibition 
sensitivity), GLMM (generalized linear mixed-effect model) 
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This question of how individuals evaluate what is morally appropriate has been 60 
extensively studied in moral psychology, often employing hypothetical moral dilemmas in 61 
which one person (i.e., the victim) has to be killed in order to save multiple others (e.g., 62 
Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Hauser, Cushman, Young, Kang-63 
Xing Jin, Mikhail, 2007; Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008). A famous example is the trolley 64 
dilemma, in which five workmen are tied to the railway tracks while a runaway trolley is 65 
about to kill them. The only way participants can save the workmen is by moving a lever that 66 
diverts the trolley onto another track. However, one other person stands on this other track 67 
and would thus be killed. Participants are then asked whether or not it is morally acceptable 68 
to kill one person in order to save the five workmen (Foot, 1967). Studies using such stimuli 69 
have revealed three important findings. First, people do not seem to follow strict normative 70 
rules when judging what is morally appropriate (e.g., Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; 71 
Moore et al., 2008). Second, situational factors such as whether the victim has to be killed 72 
personally (e.g., by pushing someone) or impersonally (e.g., by moving a lever) affect moral 73 
judgement (personal-impersonal factor; e.g., Greene et al., 2001; Moore et al., 2008). Other 74 
such situational factors are whether the death of a victim is inevitable or avoidable 75 
(inevitable-avoidable factor) and whether the death of the victim also leads to saving the 76 
participant or only saves others without the participant being endangered (self-other 77 
beneficial factor; Moore et al., 2008). Third, moral decision making is also predicted by 78 
personality variables (Moore, Stevens, & Conway, 2011; see also Kahane, Everett, Earp, 79 
Farias, & Savulescu, 2015) such as behavioural approach sensitivity (BAS), which is related 80 
to higher sensitivity towards gaining positive outcomes, and behavioural inhibition sensitivity 81 
(BIS), which is related to a higher sensitivity towards avoiding negative outcomes (Carver & 82 
White, 1994). Moore and colleagues (2011) showed that BAS is related to deciding that it is 83 
morally appropriate to kill one person to save multiple others (also called the utilitarian 84 
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choice) – as saving five people represents a positive outcome - and BIS is related to deciding 85 
in a non-utilitarian fashion – as to avoid actively causing someone’s death. 86 
Importantly, one highly influential personality construct has never been investigated 87 
in regard to moral decision making: human motives (e.g., Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2008; 88 
McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989; Schultheiss, 2008). According to motivational 89 
theory individuals seek situations, actions, and goals depending on how much incentive value 90 
the individuals implicitly or explicitly assign to them, as well as on their expectancy of 91 
reaching them. The assigned incentive value corresponds with the person’s implicit or 92 
explicit motive (Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2008). We propose that situations which allow 93 
people to have impact on others (e.g., the moral decision of harming someone, or, 94 
alternatively, the moral decision to save multiple others), act as an incentive for individuals 95 
with a strong power motive. This motive is defined by a desire to have an impact on others by 96 
influencing their attitudes, emotions and behaviours as well as by a desire to attain prestige 97 
and reputation (e.g., Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2008; Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012; 98 
Winter, 1988). Similar to other motives such as affiliation, achievement, or intimacy, 99 
researchers usually differentiate between an implicit and an explicit/self-attributed motive 100 
component (e.g., Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012). Whereas the implicit power motive 101 
usually predicts task performance (e.g., Koestner, Weinberger, & McClelland, 1991) – for 102 
example how well someone will do in a power profession (e.g., Zaccaro, Kemp, & Bader, 103 
2004) – the explicit power motive usually predicts conscious decision making (e.g., 104 
McClelland et al., 1989) – for example the decision as to whether someone wants to pursue a 105 
power profession (Jackson, 1974). 106 
In this study we investigated the relationship between the explicit power motive and 107 
moral decision making using hypothetical moral dilemmas. We focused on the explicit power 108 
motive since we were asking for a conscious decision of whether or not something was 109 
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morally acceptable, which is more likely to be influenced by the explicit rather than the 110 
implicit power motive (McClelland et al., 1989). Importantly, the explicit power motive can 111 
be divided into two components: hope to gain power (h_Power) and fear to lose power 112 
(f_Power). Notably, h_Power and BAS are conceptually similar; both are related to a 113 
sensitivity to gaining a positive outcome. However, whereas BAS is generally related to any 114 
positive outcome, h_Power is related to the specific positive outcome of gaining influence 115 
over other people. Similarly f_Power is somewhat similar to BIS but related to a sensitivity of 116 
avoiding the specific negative outcome of losing influence on other people (Elliot, & Thrash, 117 
2002; Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012; see Table 2 for correlations).  118 
We propose that choosing the utilitarian option is preferred by individuals with a 119 
higher h_Power, as by killing one person to save multiple others they actively gain influence 120 
on other people. Arguably, by not acting many persons and their lives are also strongly affected; 121 
however, in this case it is not the power motivated person themselves who actively exerts influence on 122 
other people but the properties of the situation (e.g., the runaway trolley). Thus, this decision should 123 
not be as appealing to power motivated people. Moreover, as the positive outcome of saving 124 
multiple others seems to be more specific to h_Power than to BAS, we hypothesise h_Power 125 
to predict utilitarian choices above and beyond the previously established influence of BAS 126 
(Moore et al., 2011). We have no clear hypothesis about the fear of losing power component 127 
as neither of the two dilemma options seems to imply actually losing power.  128 
 129 
2. Methods  130 
2.1 Participants 131 
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We collected data from 150 student participants who were reimbursed with £5 or 132 
course credit. Data from one participant was removed due uninterpretable questionnaire data; 133 
hence we report data from 149 participants (age: M = 22.09 ± 4.29 years; 112 females). 134 
2.2 Materials 135 
2.2.1 Unified motive scales  136 
We measured the power motive, more precisely the h_Power and the f_Power, with 137 
the Unified Motives Scales (UMS; Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012). Altogether this 138 
questionnaire consisted of 38 items, 6 items measure h_Power and 5 items measure the two 139 
f_Power components “fear to lose reputation” and “fear to lose control” (r = .43; two and 140 
three items, respectively). The remaining 26 items measured fear and hope components of 141 
other motives, which were not considered in this analysis.  142 
2.2.2 BIS-BAS scales  143 
BIS and BAS were measured with the 24 item BIS-BAS scales (Carver & White, 144 
1994). Although using three subscales of BAS is recommended (Carver & White, 1994), we 145 
instead used a single averaged BAS score since we had no specific hypotheses regarding the 146 
subscales (cf. Moore et al., 2011; see also Jorm, Christensen, Henderson, Jacomb, Korten, & 147 
Rodgers, 1998). 148 
2.2.3 Moral dilemmas  149 
Moral dilemmas were taken from previous studies (Moore et al., 2008; Moore et al., 150 
2011; see Table 1) and consisted of 24 dilemma-type situations in each of which the 151 
participant had to decide whether it was morally acceptable to kill one person to save 152 
multiple others. Each scenario had a personal and impersonal resolution variant (personal-153 
impersonal factor). The self-other beneficial and the inevitable-avoidable factors were 154 
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crossed with this personal-impersonal factor, yielding a 2 x 2 x 2 design. Note that only the 155 
personal-impersonal factor was varied by changing one or two sentences within the same 156 
dilemma. The inevitable-avoidable and the self-other beneficial factors were varied by using 157 
different dilemmas. Apart from that, dilemmas were matched regarding the consequences of 158 
taking or not taking action, wording, number of words (±2), as well as number and length of 159 
sentences (Moore et al., 2008). The 24 critical dilemmas were randomly intermixed with 14 160 
filler dilemmas. Every critical dilemma ended by asking if it was morally acceptable to kill 161 
one person to save multiple others. Participants were randomly assigned to either of two 162 
counterbalanced lists, consisting of 12 personal and 12 impersonal dilemma-type situations, 163 
presented randomly. 164 
Table 1 165 
Sample self-beneficial dilemma with avoidable killing. Further samples can be obtained from Moore et al. 166 
(2008). 167 
Scenario Resolution 
You are part of a U.N. humanitarian team of SCUBA 
divers who are deactivating old World War II 
underwater anti-ship mines. One member of your 
diving team scrapes himself while trying to deactivate 
a mine. The blood in the water has attracted several 
sharks in the area. A feeding frenzy is about to ensue, 
with the sharks eating everything and everyone in 
sight. You have a spear-gun, but only one spear and 
there are many sharks. The bleeding diver is 
swimming toward the last protective shark cage and 
will reach it before you and the others. The sharks, 
following the blood, are coming too close for you and 
a) Personal 
You realize that if you shoot and kill the injured diver 
with your spear-gun before he reaches the cage, the 
sharks would stop to eat him while you and the others 
escaped to safety. Is it acceptable for you to kill this 




You realize that if you used the emergency remote to 
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the other divers to escape. detonate one of the mines, the resulting explosion 
would kill the injured diver before he reached the 
cage, allowing you and the others to reach safety. Is it 
acceptable for you to kill this diver in order to save 
yourself and the rest of the group? 
 168 
 169 
2.3 Procedure 170 
Participants gave informed consent and completed the BIS-BAS and UMS scales. 171 
Afterward, the experimenter instructed the participants to assume that the two dilemma 172 
options were the only possible resolutions for each situation and not to concern themselves 173 
with either the legality of the proposed actions nor whether they could actually act in such a 174 
manner themselves; instead, they were to focus only on whether or not the action/resolution 175 
was morally acceptable. Then, the participants answered two practice dilemmas before the 176 
main task. All stimuli were presented on a 17 inch computer screen using methods identical 177 
to Moore and colleagues (2008); briefly, text was presented in two paragraphs, with the 178 
second presented sentence by sentence. Each sentence required the participant to press a 179 
button when finished reading it, triggering the next sentence to appear, until the resolution, 180 
where the judgement was indicated by either pressing "A" or "L" on a standard keyboard. 181 
The computer recorded response times (RT) and responses. 182 
 183 
3. Results 184 
3.1 Analytical Approach 185 
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We employed generalised linear mixed effects models (GLMM) with a logistic link 186 
function (see Table 3) using the glmer function in R’s (version 3.1.1; R Core Team, 2012) 187 
lme4 package (version 1.1-7; Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014) for all our analyses. 188 
These types of models are most beneficial in designs with crossed random effects (Baayen, 189 
Davidson, & Bates, 2008), which means that random variation is introduced by both subjects 190 
and items (in this case dilemmas). One reason being that when applying models that only 191 
account for random variation between subjects but not items (e.g., Ciaramelli, Muccioli, 192 
Ladavas, & di Pellegrino, 2007; Moore et al., 2008), one cannot generalise findings across 193 
the population of items; in other words, findings are limited to the specific set of items (e.g., 194 
Baayen et al., 2008; Clark, 1973). Importantly, when using multilevel models such as 195 
GLMMs, simulations have shown that the maximal random effects structure justified by the 196 
design is most beneficial to minimise Type I errors while only producing minor reductions in 197 
statistical power (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). Therefore, we used the maximal 198 
random effects structure in all our models: random intercepts for subjects and dilemmas, by-199 
subject random slopes for the personal-impersonal, inevitable-avoidable and self-other 200 
beneficial factors and by-dilemma random slopes for the personal-impersonal factor. The five 201 
personality variables were standardised and showed no strong correlations (see Table 2).  202 
Table 2 203 
Pearson product-moment correlations with p values adjusted by Holm correction for multiple tests. Standard 204 
deviations and [range] on diagonal.  205 
 BAS BIS h_Power FoLC FoLR Cron-
bach's 
Alpha 
BAS 0.72 [-2.16 to 1.40]      .74 
BIS -.11 3.43 [13 to 28]    .78 
h_Power .26* -.07 6.05 [6 to 36]   .88 
FoLC .20 .43** .45** 2.97 [5 to 18]  .74 
FoLR .09 .31** .33** .43** 2.36 [2 to 12] .85 
11 
 
** p < .01, *p < .05.  206 
 207 
Table 3 208 
Comparison of model fits as indicated by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Bayesian Information 209 
Criterion (BIC) and Log-Likelihood (LogLik) for 13 models predicting the probability of a utilitarian choice.  210 
Coefficient codes represent the following: P = Personal-impersonal factor, S = Self-other-beneficial, I = 211 
Inevitable-avoidable, BAS = Behavioural approach sensitivity, BIS = Behavioural inhibition sensitivity, 212 
h_Power = Hope to gain power, FoLC = Fear of losing control, FoLR = Fear of losing reputation. An asterisk 213 
marks an interaction term.   214 
Model  
Number 
Model description No. of 
parameters 
AIC BIC LogLik 
Confirmatory models 
1 P,S,I,h_Power 18 3656.73 3768.01 -1810.37 
2 P,S,I,h_Power,BAS 19 3657.10 3774.55 -1809.55 
Exploratory models 
3 P,S,I,FoLC 18 3660.78 3772.05 -1812.39 
4 P,S,I,FoLR 18 3658.82 3770.10 -1811.41 
5 P,S,I,h_Power,S*h_Power 19 3648.78 3766.23 -1805.39 
6 P,S,I,BIS,S*BIS 19 3651.71 3769.17 -1806.85 
7 P,S,I,BIS,h_Power,S*BIS,S*h_Power 21 3642.80 3772.62 -1800.40 
Follow up models 
8 P,I,h_Power (other-benef. dilemmas) 13 1877.94 1949.30 -925.97 
9 P,I,h_Power (self-benef. dilemmas) 13 1898.77 1970.13 -936.39 
10 P,I,BAS    (other-benef. dilemmas) 13 1878.35 1949.71 -926.18 
11 P,I,BAS (self-benef. dilemmas) 13 1909.60 1980.96 -941.80 
Replication models 
12 P,S,I,BAS 18 3657.81 3769.09 -1810.91 
13 P,S,I,BIS 18 3657.47 3768.74 -1810.73 
 215 
3.2 Confirmatory analysis: The hope to gain power 216 
Since coefficients in logistic regression represent log odds and factors were effect 217 
coded, the intercept in model 1 (see Table 4) shows that an average participant with an 218 
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average h_Power score had a 59% median probability2, β = 0.37, p = .210, (hereinafter 219 
baseline probability) of picking the utilitarian option across all dilemmas. This baseline 220 
decreased to 49% when killing was personal but increased to 68% when killing was 221 
impersonal, β = 0.40, p < .001. Killing someone to save oneself and others as compared to 222 
only others did not predict utilitarian choices (self-other beneficial factor, β = -0.33, p = 223 
.229). Killing someone whose death was inevitable as compared to avoidable was positively 224 
but only marginal significantly related to the utilitarian option (inevitable-avoidable factor, β 225 
= -0.44, p = .096). Note that these findings regarding the situational factors remain 226 
substantially unchanged across all models tested (see Table 3).  Most importantly, if a person 227 
had an h_Power score 1 SD below or above the population mean the baseline probability 228 
changed to 53% or 65%, respectively  (β = .27, p = .037). Thus, h_Power was indeed 229 
positively related to the probability of choosing the utilitarian option in these moral 230 
dilemmas. Notably, in a model that included both h_Power and BAS (model 2), h_Power was 231 
only marginally significant, β = .22, p = .096, whereas BAS was not significant, β = .16, p = 232 
.200. This indicates that some of the variance h_Power and BAS share was predictive of 233 
utilitarian choices but that h_Power was the overall stronger predictor.  234 
Table 4  235 
GLMM (model 1) predicting the probability of choosing the utilitarian option as a function of 236 
hope to gain power (h_Power). Situational factors were effect coded with impersonal, other-237 
beneficial and avoidable resolutions coded as 1.  238 
Fixed effects β SE Z value p 
Intercept   0.37 0.29  1.26 .201 
Level 1: Dilemmas     
  Personal-impersonal   0.40 0.10  4.21 < .001 
  Self-other beneficial -0.33 0.27 -1.20 .229 
                                                          
2 All the probabilities given here are median population probabilities; however, note that median probabilities 
between 0.2 and 0.8 are close to the mean probabilities as the logit function is almost linear in this range.  
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  Inevitable-Avoidable -0.44 0.27 -1.67 .096 
Level 2: Participants     
  h_Power  0.27 0.13  2.08 .037 
Random effects ơ Correlation matrix 





Self-other b.   Intercept 1.42 
  Personal-impersonal 0.21  -.18   
  Self-other beneficial 0.28 -.59 -.16  
  Inevitable-Avoidable 0.19 -.35 -.30 .96 
By Dilemma     
  Intercept 1.30 Intercept   
  Personal-impersonal 0.40 -.17   
 239 
3.3 Exploratory analysis 240 
To explore whether the five personality variables (see Table 2) would interact with 241 
any of the situational factors, we built several models with interaction terms while lowering 242 
our alpha level to .01 to counteract the inflation of type I errors due to multiple testing. The 243 
only significant interactions were between h_Power and self vs. other beneficial dilemmas, as 244 
well as between BIS and self vs. other beneficial dilemmas. Model 7 (see Table 5 and Figure 245 
1), which included both interactions, shows that an average person, with average h_Power 246 
and BIS scores, across all dilemmas had a 59% baseline probability, β = 0.37, p = .202, of 247 
picking the utilitarian option. In self-beneficial dilemmas, this probability changed to 51% or 248 
67%,  for participants who scored 1 SD below or above the mean of h_Power, respectively 249 
(main effect of h_Power: β = 0.34, p = .006). On the other hand, in other-beneficial dilemmas 250 
the baseline probability only changed to 55% or 64% for participants who scored 1 SD below 251 
or above the mean of h_Power, respectively (interaction of h_Power and self-beneficial 252 
factor: β = -0.15, p = .002; see Figure 1). The interaction of self-other beneficial dilemmas 253 
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and BIS was of almost equal magnitude but its direction was reversed. Whereas in self-254 
beneficial dilemmas scores of 1 SD below or above the mean of BIS predicted a change of 255 
baseline probability to 67% or 51%, respectively, (marginally significant main effect of BIS: 256 
β = -0.33, p = .014), these scores predicted a change of 63% or 55% in other-beneficial 257 
dilemmas (interaction of BIS and self-beneficial factor: β = 0.13, p = .008). Hence, 258 
participants with higher h_Power or lower BIS were more likely to pick the utilitarian option 259 
in dilemmas where their own life was at stake as compared to dilemmas in which only other 260 
persons' lives were endangered. The f_Power components both showed no significant 261 
influence (ps > .136, models 3 & 4). 262 
Table 5  263 
GLMM (model 7) predicting the probability of choosing the utilitarian option as a function of 264 
h_Power and BIS. Situational factors were effect coded with impersonal, other-beneficial and 265 
avoidable resolutions coded as 1.  266 
Fixed effects β SE Z value p 
Intercept   0.37 0.29  1.28 .202 
Level 1: Dilemmas     
  Personal-impersonal   0.41 0.10  4.26 < .001 
  Self-other beneficial -0.34 0.27 -1.25 .211 
  Inevitable-Avoidable -0.44 0.27 -1.66 .097 
Level 2: Participants     
  h_Power  0.34 0.12  2.74 .006 
  BIS -0.33 0.13 -2.47 .014 
Cross-level interaction     
  Self-other*h_Power -0.15 0.05 -3.04 .002 
  Self-other*BIS  0.13 0.05  2.64 .008 
Random effects ơ Correlation matrix 





Self-other b.   Intercept 1.39 
  Personal-impersonal 0.22  .04   
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  Self-other beneficial 0.24 -.65 -.55  
  Inevitable-Avoidable 0.19 -.11 -.39  .77 
By Dilemma     
  Intercept 1.29 Intercept   




Figure 1. Predicted median probabilities for making a utilitarian choice as a function of hope 270 
to gain power across personal-impersonal and self-other beneficial factors. 271 
3.4 Follow up and replication analysis 272 
To test whether the main effect of h_Power (model 1) was solely driven by the higher 273 
order interaction found in the exploratory analysis, we investigated models similar to model 1 274 
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but with either only other-beneficial dilemmas (model 8) or only self-beneficial dilemmas 275 
(model 9). Whereas h_Power was only marginally significant in model 8, β = .20, p = .089, it 276 
was significant in model 9, β = .50, p < .001. Notably, h_Power was still a better predictor 277 
than BAS. In models including BAS, the personal-impersonal, and inevitable-avoidable 278 
factors (similar to model 12), BAS was neither significant when including only other-279 
beneficial, β = .19, p = .115, (model 10) nor when including only self-beneficial dilemmas, β 280 
= .18, p = .194, (model 11). 281 
Finally, we could only somewhat replicate findings by Moore and colleagues (2011) 282 
as BAS (β = 0.22, p < .071; model 12) and BIS (β = -0.26, p < .056; model 13) both only 283 
attained marginal significance. In order to directly compare our findings to Moore and 284 
colleagues (2011), we conducted a 2x2x2 within-subjects ANCOVA including all three 285 
situational factors as well as BIS and BAS as between-subject covariates. In this analysis, 286 
which only takes the random variation between subjects into account, all three situational 287 
factors were highly significant Fs(1,145) > 42.71, ps < .001. Regarding the covariates, only 288 
BIS attained significance, F(1,145) = 7.12, p = .009 on its own, whereas BAS did not, 289 
F(1,145) = 1.36,  p = .245. Moreover, BIS interacted significantly with all three situational 290 
factors ps < .042; BAS only interacted marginally significantly with personal-impersonal, p < 291 
.085. This mostly replicates previous findings, except for the non-significant main effect of 292 
BAS and the significant interaction between BIS and the self-other beneficial factor. 293 
Repeating this analysis with h_Power yielded the previously found significant main effect of 294 
h_Power, F(1,147) = 7.78, p = .006, as well as a significant interaction between h_Power and 295 
the self-other beneficial factor, F(1,147) = 8.85, p = .003.   296 
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4. Discussion 297 
Here we found that a higher explicit hope to gain power (h_Power; Schönbrodt & 298 
Gerstenberg, 2012) was positively related to making the utilitarian choice (i.e., deciding that 299 
it is morally acceptable to kill one person to save multiple others) in hypothetical moral 300 
dilemmas. Importantly, in an exploratory analysis, we found that the probability of making 301 
this choice as a function of h_Power was even higher when participants’ own lives are at 302 
stake as compared to only the lives of others (self-other beneficial factor). This higher-order 303 
interaction seemed to have a strong impact on the main effect of h_Power, as h_Power was 304 
just marginally significant in a model which included only other-beneficial dilemmas but was 305 
significant in a model which included only self-beneficial dilemmas. We found a similar, but 306 
reverse, interaction between behavioural inhibition sensitivity (BIS; Carver & White, 1994) 307 
and the self-other beneficial factor, which was independent of the interaction of the self-other 308 
beneficial factor with h_Power. The probability of making a utilitarian choice decreased as a 309 
function of BIS when participants’ own lives were at stake as compared to only the lives of 310 
others. The fear of losing power components, “fear of losing control” and “fear of losing 311 
reputation” (Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012), did not predict utilitarian choices. 312 
A previous study has found that behavioural approach sensitivity (BAS; Carver & 313 
White, 1994) is also related to making utilitarian choices (Moore et al., 2011). We somewhat 314 
replicated this finding, as BAS was marginally significant in our analysis. Notably, both the 315 
coefficients of h_Power and BAS were of much smaller magnitude when including them as 316 
predictors together as compared to separately. This is unlikely to be explained by simply 317 
having lower statistical power in a model with more predictors, so we conclude that some of 318 
the shared variance of h_Power and BAS was predictive of utilitarian choices. As both 319 
constructs represent a sensitivity to gaining a positive outcome (Elliot & Thrash, 2002; 320 
Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012) we believe that this communality explains the shared 321 
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predictive variance. Moreover, as we argued that the moral decision of killing one person to 322 
save multiple others is a more specific positive outcome for individuals high in h_Power as 323 
compared to individuals high in BAS, this is likely to explain why h_Power is a stronger 324 
predictor in these dilemmas than BAS.  325 
It should be noted that we also replicated a previously found main effect of personal 326 
vs. impersonal killing on participants' likelihood to make a utilitarian choice (Moore et al., 327 
2008). More precisely, participants were more likely to make a utilitarian choice when a 328 
victim could be killed in an impersonal way. However, we did not replicate the main effects 329 
for inevitable vs. avoidable killings and self vs. other-beneficial killings (e.g., Moore et al., 330 
2008). This is likely to be due to the analysis strategy we applied, which not only accounted 331 
for variability between subjects but also between dilemmas; thus allowing generalisability 332 
across both subjects and dilemmas. Analysing our data in a by-subject ANCOVA (cf. Moore 333 
et al., 2008; Moore et al., 2011), indeed yields p values below .001 for all situational factors. 334 
Nonetheless, both non-significant main effects in our models pointed in the previously found 335 
direction and might be covered up by low statistical power (i.e., having too few dilemmas).   336 
The interaction between h_Power and the self-other beneficial factor indicates that 337 
individuals with a higher explicit power motive have a tendency to shift their moral 338 
perception in a way so that those solutions which are beneficial for themselves also appear to 339 
be more morally acceptable. This finding is in line with research showing exploitative/selfish 340 
tendencies in power motivated individuals in economic exchange games such as money 341 
allocation tasks (Quirin, Beckenkamp, & Kuhl, 2009), prisoner's dilemma games (Terhune, 342 
1968) or dictator games (Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012). However, this is not to say that 343 
individuals with a high power motive necessarily act egoistically. For example, Winter 344 
(1985) found that the implicit power motive in women, who had younger siblings, predicted 345 
“responsible social power actions” whereas the same motive predicted profligate behaviour in 346 
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women, who did not have younger siblings. Some researchers (e.g., McClelland, 1970) even 347 
suggested distinguishing between a socialised power and a personalised power motive, which 348 
has since received some empirical validation (e.g., Magee & Langner, 2008; Schultheiss, 349 
Campbell, & McClelland, 1999). Moreover, as the power motive is defined by both a desire 350 
to influence other people as well as by a desire for prestige and reputation, being in a context 351 
in which one's behaviour is made overt to other people might also be a moderating factor. For 352 
example, controlling someone might satisfy one’s needs but might be regarded negatively by 353 
others, and thus might be suppressed. One could even imagine a situation in which a need for 354 
control – achieved by acting manipulative and selfishly - and a need for prestige and 355 
reputation - achieved by acting overtly prosocial – could yield competing behavioural 356 
strategies.  357 
4.1 Concluding remarks 358 
Moral decisions, especially those regarding caring for or harming other people are 359 
prevalent in our daily lives (Hofmann et al., 2014). Importantly, studies have shown that 360 
individuals do not follow normative rules (e.g., Moore et al., 2008) and that certain 361 
situational (e.g., Greene et al., 2001, Moore et al., 2008) and certain personality variables 362 
affect moral decision making (e.g., Kahane, 2015; Moore et al., 2011). In this study we show 363 
for the first time that a hope to gain power is positively related to making utilitarian moral 364 
decisions especially in situations in which a person’s own life is at stake, as compared to only 365 
the lives of others. An interesting next step would be to investigate how this moral bias 366 
relates to people in power professions, as the power motive is particularly prevalent in these 367 
professions (Jackson, 1974; Jenkins, 1994) and because their moral decisions can have a 368 
major impact on other people’s lives (e.g., when deciding whether or not to send soldiers to 369 
war). For people in power professions but also for the general public it is important to be 370 
aware of the factors which bias their own moral perception, since only then they can take 371 
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conscious measures against them to attain a more balanced moral judgement. The hope to 372 
gain power certainly is one of those moral biasing factors.  373 
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